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Two terms used as frameworks for scientific experimentation—the “hypothesis” and the 
“model”—carry distinct philosophical assumptions, with important consequences for the 
practicing scientist.Scientists are commonly taught to frame 
their experiments with a “hypothesis”—
an idea or postulate that must be 
phrased as a statement of fact, so that 
it can be subjected to falsification. The 
hypothesis is constructed in advance of 
the experiment; it is therefore unproven 
in its original form. The very idea of 
“proof” of a hypothesis is problematic 
on philosophical grounds because the 
hypothesis is established to be falsified, 
not verified. The second framework for 
experimental design involves building a 
model as an explanation for a data set. 
A model is distinct from a hypothesis 
in that it is constructed after data are 
derived. In contrast to the hypothesis, 
the model must be held up for verifica-
tion—its success is determined by its 
ability to predict a particular outcome. 
Furthermore, an unsuccessful, or not 
fully successful, model need not be 
scrapped in the way that the alterna-
tive framework urges the rejection of a 
falsified hypothesis, but it may instead 
serve as the starting point for a suit-
ably refined successor. The concept 
of a model’s “verification” requires an 
acceptance of “inductive reasoning”—a 
form of logic that allows the scientist to 
both generalize a particular result and 
say that the same result will occur in the 
future—which itself has been criticized. 
Although many scientists use the term 
“hypothesis” when they mean “model,” 
we will maintain the distinction that 
the hypothesis is an unproven premise 
whereas the model is data derived, to 
discriminate between “top-down prem-
ise/deduction” and “bottom-up data/
induction.” A recent article proposes 
that the availability of large amounts 
of scientific data renders the need for 
a pre-existing hypothesis obsolete 378 Cell 134, August 8, 2008 ©2008 Elsevie(Anderson, 2008). Given the ability of 
scientists to gather vast amounts of sci-
entific data—by sequencing genomes, 
surveying changes in the expression 
of every gene, or analyzing proteomic 
changes in response to a stimulus—is a 
hypothesis the most appropriate way to 
frame such experiments (Glass, 2006)? 
Here, we discuss the philosophical rea-
soning that motivated original and cur-
rent notions of the hypothesis and its 
implications for scientific experimental 
design.
The Novum Organum
Galileo helped to initiate the renais-
sance in science that occurred in 
Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
by upending religious dogma as to the 
centrality of Earth’s position in the uni-
verse, through mathematical reasoning 
and observation. He was described by 
a Paduan contemporary as “the father 
of experiments and all their exact-
ness.” Galileo’s approach was in line 
with Greek antecedents, especially 
Aristotle and Archimedes, in his reli-
ance on “deductive” reasoning stem-
ming from hypotheses. The hypoth-
esis as it was used in the 1500s was 
a premise—a starting point based on 
unproven assumptions. From the initial 
premise, deductions would be made, 
and their success or failure was deter-
mined by subjective assessments as to 
whether they were satisfactory in their 
explanations of the premise. Although 
this method resulted in “satisfactory” 
conclusions as applied by Galileo, the 
same cannot be said of some other 
16th century physicists, who applied 
fictitious and nonrealistic theories to 
physics as well as to astronomy (Blake 
et al., 1966). The lack of a founda-r Inc.tion for the hypothesis characterized 
the 1500s as a “century of confusion” 
(Hall, 1962), in which there was clear 
excitement over new developments 
but no programmatic march forward 
due to a lack of an accepted method 
to distinguish between various claims 
of discovery. Galileo represented a 
move to a hypothesis more grounded 
in realism, and an increased emphasis 
on the experiment as the basis for con-
clusions, but he did not systematize 
his approach into a methodology that 
could be clearly followed by others.
It was Francis Bacon who in 1620 
wrote an approach to scientific meth-
odology—his Novum Organum or “new 
instrument”—new because Bacon took 
issue with Aristotle’s Organon (the term 
given by Aristotle’s followers to his sys-
tem of logic) in several respects (Bacon, 
1620). Bacon noted that deductive rea-
soning by itself is not sufficient because 
if the premise is set in advance of the 
experiment, for example by a hypoth-
esis, the reasoning would be twisted 
to meet that premise. Bacon therefore 
argued that a purely experimentation-
based methodology was necessary, and 
that to solve problems with pre-existing 
bias, “the only hope is true induction.”
With “inductive reasoning” a data set is 
taken and used to infer that under similar 
circumstances the result will be repeated, 
and that the finding as applied to a spe-
cific case may be generalized to other 
cases of like kind. In the case of grav-
ity, one observes first that a mass falls 
toward earth at a particular rate, and later 
that it does so in a predictable and “veri-
fiable” manner, meaning that after hav-
ing established the rule for how quickly 
objects descend, one can predict that 
descending bodies will continue to follow 
the rule. The prediction that a falling apple 
will behave in the future the same way it 
behaved in the past is inductive reason-
ing, as is extending the findings to other 
objects, such as an orange or a meteor. 
Bacon was careful to distinguish the type 
of induction that is adequate, and the 
process that he described sounds like 
scientific method as it is currently prac-
ticed, that is, a series of experiments that 
allow the scientist to make claims as to 
how things work, based on the process of 
refining a model by the gathering of “neg-
atives” and “affirmatives.” This “bottom-
up” approach was required to escape 
preconceived notions, including dogma. 
The difference between prior method and 
the methodology that launched a revolu-
tion in European science was a strict pro-
cess of questioning in which experimen-
tal data, not pre-existing ideologies, were 
the basis for knowledge.
Newton’s Rejection of the 
 Hypothesis
Starting with the second edition of his 
seminal work, the Principia, Isaac New-
ton included a now-famous philosophical 
section, in which appeared the phrase 
“Hypotheses non fingo.” Andrew Motte, 
who did the first English translation in 
1729, rendered the term as, “I frame no 
hypotheses.” Newton stated his views 
on hypotheses even more explicitly in his 
Opticks, noting that “Hypotheses are not 
to be regarded in experimental Philoso-
phy” (Newton, 1721).
Newton was consistent with Bacon in 
the primacy of the experiment or proof 
to construct a rule as to how reality 
operated and in his willingness to use 
the rule inductively. He also came to 
reject the hypothesis as being incon-
sistent with this bottom-up approach 
as it would frame the project with an 
unproven premise—in line with the criti-
cism made earlier by Bacon. As for how 
his data-based rules were to be used, 
Newton wrote that inductions “should 
be considered either exactly or very 
nearly true until new phenomena may 
make them either more exact or liable 
to exceptions” (Newton, 1729); his 
laws were accepted because they suc-
ceeded in describing how the physical 
world worked. Newton thus saw a dis-
tinction between some claims about the 
world, hypotheses, that, due to a lack of experimental proof, should be avoided 
and others, inductions, that, thanks to 
their grounding in experiment, deserved 
to be supported. Newton was similar to 
Bacon in his willingness to amend mod-
els based on data. Therefore, the way 
in which Newton established inductions 
by empirical evidence was not the way 
that a mathematical theorem could be 
established—by deduction from some 
axioms.
Hume’s Rejection of Inductive 
Reasoning
The idea that past experience can be 
used as “proof” of future outcomes was 
rejected by the 18th century Scottish 
philosopher David Hume. Hume intro-
duced a “radical skepticism”—the idea 
that one could not use past experience 
to predict the future. He applied the 
rejection of experience even to gravity, 
noting that the prior experience that an 
object may be wed to certain qualities is 
no guarantee that this will be the case 
in the future. Even the idea of identity—
for example, whether one could say that 
a chair left unobserved in a room upon 
exiting continues to exist in the absence 
of verification, or whether it would be the 
same chair upon re-entering the room—
is not verifiable (Hume, 1749).
Hume’s most notable contribution 
to the philosophy of science was this 
“problem of induction”… that one can-
not claim that a past result predicts the 
future because such a claim is based 
on the unprovable premise that a thing 
and its attributes will remain bound to 
each other, that nature’s laws are stable. 
Hume’s clever objection came by estab-
lishing first that all inductive reasoning 
is based on the assumption that nature 
is uniform (throughout space and time), 
second by inquiring how we justify this 
assumption, and then by pointing out 
that it looks circular to say “We are jus-
tified in believing that nature is uniform 
because it has always been uniform in 
the past.”
Critical Rationalism
In the 20th century, the Austrian philoso-
pher Karl Popper sought to produce a 
philosophy of science that was consis-
tent with Hume’s critique of induction 
(Popper, 1959). Popper’s work is the 
basis for much of the framing terminol-Cell 1ogy used by practicing scientists today, 
particularly his use of the word “hypoth-
esis,” which was distinct from the way 
the term was used by earlier philoso-
phers (Popper, 1959). Popper’s solution 
to the “problem” of inductive reasoning 
was to suggest a methodology where 
concepts are subjected to falsification, 
as opposed to verification. In this way, 
one could avoid the circumstance where 
an idea is stated to be “true,” implying 
that it will hold to be accurate in the 
future, and rather focus on whether the 
idea could be proven false. Such an 
approach seems attractive because it 
establishes a framework where a single 
piece of contrary evidence would be 
deemed sufficient to claim that a hypoth-
esis had been proven wrong. However, 
a corollary to the framework is that no 
amount of supporting, or nonfalsifying, 
evidence would be sufficient for verifica-
tion, where the term “verification” is used 
to claim that a rule could be said to be 
predictive or to make use of induction. 
Popper’s philosophical approach was 
termed “Critical Rationalism,” continuing 
Hume’s theme that inductive reasoning 
was not rational.
In Defense of Induction
Critical Rationalism has not been with-
out detractors, and inductive reasoning 
does not lack for defenders. However, 
the most common argument leveled 
against Popper’s framework is that Criti-
cal Rationalism fails to avoid inductive 
reasoning (Kuhn, 1977). For example, 
one might ask first what motivated the 
construction of a hypothesis; the motiva-
tion is demonstrably the scientist’s infer-
ence based on past experience. Pop-
per responded that anything could be 
used to motivate a hypothesis, and that 
the type of motivation was not relevant 
(Popper, 1959). This answer may sound 
disingenuous and inconsistent with how 
science actually operates. As the math-
ematician Henri Poincaré noted, “It is 
often said that experiments should be 
made without preconceived ideas. That 
is impossible. Not only would it make 
every experiment fruitless, but even if we 
wished to do so, it could not be done” 
(Poincaré, 1952).
As to a defense of induction, one 
might ask how it is possible to distin-
guish between a scientific fact and 34, August 8, 2008 ©2008 Elsevier Inc. 379
science fiction if one is not allowed to 
say that a particular model predicts the 
future better than an alternative. If one 
cannot say that the experience that an 
apple falls toward Earth predicts that 
the apple will fall toward Earth, then sci-
ence has no greater claim than religion 
or fantasy as to the fate of the apple 
when it is released tomorrow. Poincaré 
argued that if a thing and its aspect are 
separable, this should be seen with a 
sufficient number of tests, and thus one 
will eventually succeed in either falsify-
ing an incorrect hypothesis or in using 
the lack of falsifying data as proof of 
verification. Poincaré’s reasoning is 
both inductive and probabilistic, as it is 
based on doing a sufficient number of 
experiments to obtain data that can be 
used to predict future outcomes.
Even Hume invoked probability to 
reject claims of miracles—he wrote 
that nothing is credible which is con-
tradictory to experience, or at variance 
with the laws of nature (Hume, 1749)—a 
position that seems to be a defense of 
induction, or pretty close to it. Thus, 
despite Popper’s blanket rejection of 
probability as justifying induction, it is 
probability (which necessarily implies a 
data set based on experimentation) that 
may answer the “problem of induction” 
(Carnap, 1980; Hall and Hájek, 2001). 
If the reader finds the reasoning to be 
circular, the response is that prob-
ability shifts the burden to the critic. If 
one has shown in a sufficient number 
of instances that result A is achieved, 
then at some point it becomes the 
critic’s responsibility to show that B, 
or at least “not A,” may be achieved. 
If there is no evidence for “B” (or if the 
result “B” is improbable) then one may 
say that predicting result A is rational. 
This is tricky, though, because of the 
Humean claim that prior probabilities 
are irrelevant to future instances. Thus, 
for a system based on probabilities to 
get a proper footing, one must recog-
nize that there are built-in preferences 
for particular types of models and be 
satisfied with a system that is shown to 
be “workable,” if not ultimately “prov-
able” (Russell, 1912). The experience 
that the law of gravity holds “true” in 
thousands of attempts to show it not to 
be true allows the scientist to ask the 
skeptic to demonstrate how it could be 380 Cell 134, August 8, 2008 ©2008 Elsevieruntrue in the future. As the British phi-
losopher Bertrand Russell explained, 
the relation between a thing and the 
rule that controls that thing may be 
shown to be nonseparable by experi-
ence, thus establishing the force of 
inductive reasoning (Russell, 1912).
As for claims that falsification is 
more “scientific” than verification, there 
are problems with falsification as well; 
for example, it might be impossible to 
conclusively “disprove” a hypothesis 
because despite the claim about a sin-
gle counterexample being sufficient, 
there remain semantic maneuvers that 
might be used to reinstate a hypothesis, 
by ignoring or defining away negative 
data. Although Thomas Kuhn was not 
an inductivist, he quoted Popper in this 
way: “In point of fact, no conclusive dis-
proof of a theory can ever be produced; 
for it is always possible to say that the 
experimental results are not reliable 
or that the discrepancies which are 
asserted to exist between the experi-
mental results and the theory are only 
apparent and that they will disappear 
with the advance of our understanding.” 
Kuhn continues, “For Sir Karl [Popper], 
they are an essential qualification which 
threatens the integrity of his basic posi-
tion. Having barred conclusive disproof, 
he has provided no substitute for it, and 
the relation he does employ remains 
that of logical falsification. Though he 
is not a naïve falsificationist, Sir Karl, 
may, I suggest, legitimately be treated 
as one” (Kuhn, 1977). Robert Nozick 
was even more dismissive, making note 
of the inductive properties of Popper’s 
anti-inductive philosophy and finally 
labeling Popper as “incoherent” (Noz-
ick, 2001).
Hypotheses and Experiments
If the hypotheses used in current scien-
tific practice are in fact held up for veri-
fication, this would seem to reinvigorate 
the same concerns about hypotheses 
that Bacon and Newton delineated. 
The hypothesis may be “dangerous”—
it may be used to filter data and induce 
bias. Therefore, scientists operating 
in an inductive framework might be 
insulated from an impulse to defend 
an unproven premise by adhering to a 
bottom-up method, producing experi-
mentally derived data in order to build  Inc.a model, and then subjecting the model 
to tests for its ability to predict the 
future. If the model passes such a test, 
its inductive power is demonstrated.
How then might one frame the first 
experiment, before sufficient data are 
gathered to produce a model? Absent 
information as to how a process works, 
it would seem that a question is the 
appropriate tool because the question, 
as opposed to a hypothesis, properly 
identifies the scientist as being in a 
state of ignorance when data are absent 
(Glass, 2006). The question is then used 
as a basis to accumulate data. From the 
data one then builds a model, which 
can be subjected to tests for its induc-
tive ability. As Newton noted, one gath-
ers the “negatives and affirmatives” to 
refine the model, until a predictive con-
struct is derived. Such a methodology 
would eliminate the “hypothesis” term 
and substitute the “question” for set-
tings where experiments are performed 
before sufficient data exist and the 
“model” for situations where the sci-
entist is working with sufficient data to 
produce a construct that can be tested 
for inductive power.
The Critical Rationalist in Medicine
For those working in biology, and par-
ticularly in medicine, it may be worth 
noting that there are ethical problems 
that might accrue if inductive reason-
ing is abandoned. Clinical trials are 
conducted not simply to determine if 
a particular treatment works in an iso-
lated instance but more specifically to 
determine whether that treatment will 
be effective when generalized to other 
patients with that illness. Conduct-
ing clinical trials constitutes an explicit 
effort to capture enough experience to 
accurately predict whether a treatment 
will be beneficial to the general public. 
If it is said that a clinical trial is estab-
lished as an example of hypothesis fal-
sification, one might fairly ask how an 
inductive conclusion could be made. In 
particular, it is not clear how one could 
ethically espouse that a treatment be 
advocated for a patient if one adheres 
to the idea that inductive conclusions 
are not rational. There would be no basis 
to say that the prior experience with the 
drug in a clinical trial setting might be 
applied to a future patient’s case.
Of course, such an ethical concern 
would not be a reason to embrace 
inductive reasoning were inductive 
reasoning not workable. One accepts 
inductive reasoning because it can be 
demonstrated that past experience is 
predictive of future outcomes, within a 
range of probability. It is this issue of 
probability that has been so trouble-
some to many philosophers. Biological 
induction necessarily contrasts with the 
absolute predictability one might find in 
physical laws, properly circumscribed. 
However, others have accepted prob-
ability as sufficient for claims of cau-
sality. Therefore, as long as one gains a 
sufficiently large data set that is repre-
sentative of the variations observed in 
the clinic, and achieves this by demon-
strating the reproducibility of the data, 
one can join in the inductive project 
with a clinical trial outcome.
The relevance of a philosophical pos-
ture for a physician or scientist is made 
clearer by considering the patient who 
seeks treatment for his disease. The 
patient who receives a new treatment 
based on the results of an experimen-
tal trial, and as a result survives (as 
revealed by the experience of those 
patients who were not similarly treated), 
must continue to be offered the ther-
apy and would not be well served by a 
philosophical program that claims this 
past experience is irrelevant. Therefore, 
the clinical trial should not be framed 
with a hypothesis aimed at falsification 
but rather should be explicitly inductive 
because the project of the physician is 
explicitly inductive.
When one turns to basic biology, 
the issue is straightforward. Here, the 
scientist must ask whether verification 
or falsification is being sought. If the scientist concludes from a result that 
a similar result will occur, or that the 
data will establish a rule for how things 
work, then the project is inductive. If 
the experimental design is inductive, 
then the Critical Rationalist framework 
is inconsistent with the project that is 
being performed, and the hypothesis 
should be abandoned in favor of either 
a question or, if sufficient data are 
available, a model. We propose that 
building hypotheses should be aban-
doned in favor of posing a straightfor-
ward question of a system and then 
receiving an answer, using that answer 
to model reality, and then testing the 
reproducibility and predictive power of 
the model, modifying it as necessary.
Finally, when confronting a proj-
ect where comprehensive data sets 
are accumulated, such as genome 
sequences, a hypothesis may not even 
be feasible. What would such a hypoth-
esis be? Only a question is required: 
“What is the sequence of genome X?”. 
This would be followed by an answer, 
the genome sequence, that can be 
tested for reproducibility by further 
sequencing, allowing for an increasingly 
improved model for the genome. Thus, 
although a hypothesis might have been 
thought to be necessary in the past, it no 
longer seems to be so. It is better to see 
science as a quest for good questions 
to try to answer, rather than a quest for 
bold hypotheses to try to refute.
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